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Chapter 3 ‘Can we distinguish the sheep from the wolves?’:  Émigrés, Allies,
and the Reconstruction of Germany
Around half a million people fled Germany and Austria in the years after the National Socialists took power and spent
the next decade or longer in exile in a number of countries.  This chapter looks at a minority among them: the German
émigrés who wanted to return to Germany after the war. It juxtaposes their ideas about the reconstruction of the
defeated country with the ways in which the Allied governments thought about and dealt with them. Their relationship
is crucial to understanding what happened in the occupation zones after 1945, and in no field was this so visible as in
medicine and public health.
The chapter seeks to remedy a long-standing omission. The study of emigration and exile is by now a well-established
academic field, and the German-speaking emigration after 1933 has received more attention than any other, not least
by historians of science and medicine.  However, the return of émigrés after 1945 has not featured in this literature.
Only in recent decades have historians begun to examine the phenomenon at all systematically, and have coined the
term ‘re-emigration’ or ‘remigration’.  These studies have identified psychological factors which shaped individuals’
experiences of return, and argued that it was primarily the individual personalities and inclinations of the returning
émigrés that were the most significant determinants of their post-exile lives.  This chapter, by contrast, tries to
understand the structural constraints within which émigrés acted, and the extent to which their choices about their
return to Germany were confined or encouraged by the Allies.
Who wanted to return voluntarily to a defeated, bombed-out country under Allied control? Numbers are difficult to
estimate, but it is clear that only a fraction of émigrés expressed an interest in returning permanently to Germany after
the war. It was particularly those who had left because of political persecution under the Nazi regime, who were most
likely to go back: around half of the 30,000 German political émigrés eventually returned to Germany.  The Jewish-
Italian writer and political activist Laura Fermi, who emigrated to the US with her Nobel Prize-winning husband,
Enrico Fermi, wrote a study of the intellectual migration from Europe. The earliest group of ‘returnees’, she wrote,
consisted of ‘statesmen, political leaders, and others who hoped to assist in the reconstruction of their countries’. She
observed that they were in the minority, and even many of those formerly in the political limelight now preferred to
‘remain quietly’.  This reluctance to return characterized large sections of the émigré communities all over the world,
but applied particularly to those of German origin. If half of political exiles returned to Germany, that rate was
significantly lower among those who had left because of racial or religious persecution; only around 5 per cent
returned.  Some professions were more likely to consider a return, but doctors did not feature prominently in the move
back. The historian Hans-Peter Kröner estimated that between 9,000 and 10,000 German-speaking émigrés had worked
in the medical professions, and only around 5 per cent went back after the war.
Many of those who returned to Germany were motivated by an absence of opportunities for medical practice in their
countries of exile. Others, however, were driven by their desire to take an active part in the reconstruction of Germany
and its public health system, and it is those that this chapter examines. It contrasts the different occupiers’ responses to
their requests to assist in the rebuilding of Germany: British and American authorities frequently rejected cooperation
with these émigrés, usually regardless of their political orientations; the Soviet government liaised with a set of
politically useful Germans in Soviet exile who worked under Moscow's direction. The French authorities were between
these two approaches: although they distrusted and rejected many of the émigrés’ claims, they were prepared to work
with individuals and groups who supported their aims. All four occupiers’ attitudes to collaboration with exiles were
shaped by their diagnosis of the German problem.
Émigré organizations: The ‘Free Germany’ movement’
A complex network of émigré groups and organizations developed in countries across the world between 1933 and
1945. Most political shades and convictions were represented, and there were also many non-political groups: cultural
and self-help associations. These organizations were the forum where many exiles examined and debated the
possibilities of a regenerated and reconstructed Germany and prepared programmes for the future, some of which dealt
specifically with a public health system. A useful example of émigrés’ activities, and the occupiers’ responses to them,
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The Free Germany movement was a series of multi-party associations that developed in many of the prominent
countries of exile, including the Soviet Union, France, Mexico, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
and Sweden. Most of these groups were organized and directed by communists, but they also contained various
socialist, liberal, and even conservative émigrés. Following the 1935 Comintern congress and its new popular front
strategy, communists had been attempting to build such multi-party alliances.
The initial template for groups in the movement came from the Free Germany National Committee (Nationalkomitee
Freies Deutschland, NKFD) in Moscow, made up of exiled German communists and ‘re-educated’ prisoners of war. It
got off the ground after the German defeat at Stalingrad, through which large numbers of German soldiers entered
Soviet captivity. Some were willing to renounce fascism, and as such were seen as suitable material for communist re-
education. In July 1943, thirteen communist émigrés and twenty-five POWs signed a manifesto, calling on the German
population and the Wehrmacht to join the fight against Hitler, and supporting a democratic and socialist renewal of
Germany.  The signing of the NKFD's manifesto was intended to initiate the formation of similar groups across the
globe, but as Georgy Dimitrov, general secretary of the Communist International, noted in his diary in August 1943,
the creation of similar groups in Hungary, Romania, and Italy was considered but, ‘owing to unfavourable discussions
in England and America regarding the German Free Germany committee’, never took place.
The NKFD's strategy was to encourage opposition to Hitler within Germany and the Wehrmacht through radio,
newspapers, and leaflets, and to set up antifascist schools in POW camps. From January 1944 onwards, members also
worked with the Red Army, using loudspeakers or leaflets to call directly on German units to desert and surrender.
Precisely what the Kremlin's intentions were with the NKFD was much debated in London, Washington, and Paris.
Some analysts watched with alarm what they feared was the beginning of a separate Soviet peace with Germany;
others saw the NKFD as a merely a propaganda tool, which the other Allies would do well to imitate.  According to
Dimitrov, Stalin initially seemed to have envisaged a more far-reaching role for the group, including ‘[t]he struggle to
save Germany from ruin, for restoring the democratic rights and freedoms of the German people, for the establishment
of a parliamentary order, and so on’.  But as the war wore on, the Soviet government lost interest in the committee,
partly because the failed coup of July 1944 had ended hopes for a revolution within Germany. Nonetheless, it closely
monitored its activities, and, once the occupation of Germany was about to commence, drew upon the NKFD's plans
and preparations.
German émigrés in the NKFD were often also active in several different, overlapping institutions. Some worked in the
German Communist Party's (KPD) exile organization, others worked as instructors in German POW camps. Others
were active in the Soviet Army or in the Seventh Department of the Political Administration of the Army. A number
were also involved in the Comintern, or, after its dissolution, in the Department of International Information of the
Soviet Party's Central Committee. These overlapping networks of both formal organizations and informal gatherings
were an important characteristic of the world of the German exile. In Moscow, they helped to anchor some émigrés in
Soviet institutions and connected them, directly or indirectly, to Soviet officials and authorities. One of the most
prominent was Maxim Zetkin, a German doctor who later became a leading authority of the Soviet zone's health
system.  In the 1920s he had accompanied his mother, the well-known German communist leader Clara Zetkin,  to
several Comintern congresses, and worked for a number of Comintern missions.  He qualified as a doctor in 1909 in
Stuttgart. After working at a number of German clinics immediately after the First World War, he was invited to
practise surgery in Moscow.  For several years, he moved between Germany and the USSR, before emigrating in the
late 1920s. He worked at prestigious Soviet medical institutes such as the First and Fourth Moscow City Hospitals and
the surgical clinic of the Second Moscow Medical Institute. From 1936 to 1939, he served as a doctor in the
International Brigades in Spain, and from 1942 to 1945 as a military surgeon in the Caucasus.  Along with only a
very small number of German-born émigrés, Zetkin even joined the Soviet Communist Party.
The leadership of the KPD in Moscow, particularly Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, directed the work of the
NKFD and its post-war plans. The KPD had been supervising the propaganda used for German soldiers in Soviet
captivity, and had emphasized the need to train personnel to return to Germany. Pieck and Ulbricht, together with the
NKFD, constructed plans for future appointments of individuals to specific jobs and functions, producing long cadre
lists in the process.  Apart from its work with the NKFD, the KPD leadership was active in the context of the
Comintern-organized German commission which was to investigate policy for the post-war period.  It also formed its
own work commissions and task forces to prepare for German reconstruction.  A number of émigrés assisted the
Soviet commanders in dealing with civilian populations of the German regions overrun by the Red Army, and, finally,
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Although not officially sanctioned by the Soviet authorities or those of the host countries, the NKFD stimulated the
foundation of similar groups elsewhere, and gave new direction to existing organizations. One of the largest Free
German groups to be established after July 1943 operated in France, under the name of ‘Free Germany Committee for
the West’ (often referred to by its French name, Comité Allemagne Libre Pour l’Ouest, CALPO).  Its president, an
émigré communist from the Saar, Otto Niebergall, later remembered that hearing about the establishment of the NKFD
was of ‘enormous political significance’ for him and his fellow émigrés.  Listening to the manifesto being read out on
the radio, they copied, printed, and distributed it among German soldiers in France, and began to think about similar
associations in France. An appeal to found CALPO was published in the October issue of the émigré communist
propaganda paper Volk und Vaterland, and its inaugural meeting took place in November 1943. In spite of Niebergall's
influence, communists formed a minority in this group, and social democrats (particularly from the Saar), former
members of the Zentrum Party and the Deutsches Volkspartei (DVP), and German officers of the Wehrmacht were all
well represented.  The group became the centre of German popular front work in France (including Free German
committees in Toulouse, Lyons, and Marseilles), Belgium, and Luxembourg. It focused on encouraging Wehrmacht
deserters, and published several newspapers and pamphlets for this purpose.
Members of CALPO also participated in several overlapping political institutions and networks in France. CALPO was
supported by the French Communist Party (PCF), who had in autumn 1940 created a special branch of the Resistance
dedicated to infiltrating the German fascist and Vichy authorities—the Travail Allemand (TA, also known as Travail
Anti-Allemand)—and had recruited German-speaking émigrés to work in this body. Even older was the Main d’Œuvre
Immigrée (MOI), a group created by the PCF in 1924 as an umbrella organization for refugees living in France. Its
German sub-branch was flooded with émigrés who came to France after 1933 and 1935. Discussions between
members of the KPD exile group, the PCF's central committee, the TA, and the MOI pre-dated the creation of CALPO,
and signalled the degree to which this body, like that in Moscow, was connected with certain French political
institutions. Both the PCF and MOI recognized CALPO as a legitimate German resistance group. In April 1944,
CALPO was also recognized as an official German branch of the resistance by the Conseil National de la Résistance
(CNR, which existed from May 1943 as the official authority of the various Resistance groups in France), which meant
that it could now join the Maquis in southern France.
Apart from its propaganda work, CALPO's military commission also trained military cadres for the resistance and a
possible partisan war on German soil. The British and American authorities turned down its offer of collaboration, but
the French Forces of the Interior (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur, FFI—the unified and centralized army of the French
armed resistance) supported it. Around 100 German émigrés fought with the FFI in the battle for Paris. In August
1944, CALPO was allowed to send its members into the German POW camps.  And in early September 1944, some
CALPO delegates went to the western front and fought with the First Paris Regiment. It seems to have prepared fewer
detailed studies for the post-war period than other Free German groups, probably as a result of its concentration on
military and POW work. Only after the liberation of Paris in August 1944 did this become more important. Niebergall
later recalled how the liberation changed the nature of CALPO's work, not least because it received offices on the
Boulevard Montmartre from the CNR and an official paper ration for its publications from the FFI.  It now prepared
plans to assist the management of territory under Allied control, and its war crimes department compiled a list of 1,366
German individuals suspected of having committed war crimes because of their leading positions in the Gestapo and
Sicherheitsdienst.  Although in late 1944 and early 1945 CALPO's relationships with the French authorities cooled
significantly, many former CALPO members returned to Germany, some of them to the French occupation zone.
The group in Britain—the ‘Free German Movement in Great Britain’ (Freie Deutsche Bewegung in Großbritannien)—
also prepared plans for the reconstruction of post-war Germany.  Its inaugural meeting took place in September 1943
in London, during which a twenty-three-member committee was elected (roughly half of whom were communists) and
the manifesto was unveiled.  In its London base, in a series of regional groups throughout Britain, and in a variety of
‘study groups’  it attempted to prepare plans for the immediate post-war period. One of the movement's leading
members was the former KPD Reichstag deputy Wilhelm Koenen; another was the head of KPD Landesgruppe, Heinz
Schmidt. But although communists dominated here, the membership, like that of CALPO, was more complex than was
the case in Moscow. The social democrats in London had so far always rejected communist proposals to put the
popular front strategy into action. This time, while the SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) leadership
again rejected collaboration, stating that the old animosities between KPD and SPD had not been resolved,  a
significant proportion of SPD members nonetheless joined the organization, even without the support of their
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Many of the ideas of the British group were similar to those of the NKFD and CALPO. Their manifesto pledged
support of Allied policy on the defeat of Germany and its future occupation. Their aim, the manifesto stated, was to
bring about the speedy fall of Hitler and to contribute to the reconstruction of an independent, healthy, and undivided
Germany, purged of all remnants of Nazism and militarism.  The group addressed the British government in countless
appeals, memoranda, and letters. Like in Moscow and Paris, POW work was considered crucial, because ‘the largest
reservoir of the forces for a democratic reconstruction of Germany is to be found among the German prisoners of
war’.  They were to be targeted through radio broadcasts, books, and other propaganda work.  However, this work
was not endorsed by the British government.
Another group inspired by the NKFD was the Council for a Democratic Germany, which was founded in May 1944 in
New York by a number of German émigré intellectuals and politicians from various political backgrounds.  As a
result of disputes very much like those in London, the right-wing of the SPD was not represented, but overall, the
Council included a number of Catholics from a wing of the Zentrum Party, socialists from a range of affiliations,
communists, non-partisan democrats, and a few Protestants. Although communists were much less represented here
than in the British and French groups, accusations regarding its closeness to Moscow persisted.  The Council
supported Allied policy and the earliest possible defeat of Germany, but at the same time also voiced concern that the
‘good, non-fascist’ Germany had not been given a proper voice. To counter this, it proclaimed, it was necessary to
unify anti-Nazi forces abroad, and to identify representatives of a new Germany who could contribute to its
reconstruction.
Although the New York Council welcomed the Soviet use of émigrés in principle, it dismissed the Moscow Committee
as lacking in independence. The council argued that its most important role was to advise and influence the US
administration's preparations for a future occupation of Germany, and to provide informed and politically aware
background briefings. Within the council, until its formal dissolution in June 1945, a number of specialist committees
dealt with specific features of the new Germany. POW work was also considered essential here. Convinced of the need
to separate Nazi POWs from the other soldiers who could be re-educated—and dismayed by reports of the failure of
American officials to contain attacks on antifascist prisoners—the council urged the US War Department to cooperate.
However, just as was the case in Britain, none of the council's proposals were recognized or used by the American
authorities, nor did they consider cooperation with other groups of German exiles.
In sum, here were four similar-minded sets of German émigrés in four different environments. Politically active
doctors were represented in many Free German groups, including those not discussed here. (Kurt Winter, for example,
was active in the Swedish group and Rudolf Neumann in Mexico—both men will appear again in later chapters since
they worked for the health service in the Soviet zone). Each of those groups sought to cooperate with its host country's
authorities, and each attempted to participate in the future German reconstruction. A comparison of their results
highlights crucial differences between the different Allies.
Plans for the reconstruction of Germany
Many émigré groups and individuals never lost sight of what they perceived to be their function in the new Germany
(see, for example, the cover page of the émigré paper Inside Nazi Germany, Fig. 3.1). Their work accelerated in early
1943, in direct response to the Casablanca conference and its call for an unconditional surrender. In émigré circles this
announcement was greeted with relief, since it made the defeat of Germany only a matter of time. But it also posed a
direct threat to their legitimacy as representatives of any future Germany. They had not been recognized by most Allied
authorities as legitimate representatives of German interests, and they had not been officially included in the planning
process. An internal German revolt, which might have justified their claims, had not happened. Nonetheless, even
without this official backing the plans developed in émigré circles looked at what ought to happen to Germany. Some
focused on ways of toppling the Hitler regime from the inside. Many tried to explain the mistakes of the Weimar
period, and made recommendations for a second post-war reconstruction. Many also concentrated on some of the
immediate problems likely to arise in the aftermath of war, such as the huge population movements and expulsions of
Germans from Eastern European countries, the management of German POWs, the implementation of denazification
procedures, and the issue of restitution. Some plans looked specifically at the reconstruction of the German public
health system, as the following two examples show.
The first comes from the Council for a Democratic Germany in New York. Among the various committees and study
groups of the Council was a welfare committee (Fürsorgeausschuß), which looked at questions ranging from the care
of POWs in the United States to public health reforms in post-war Germany. Its president was the endocrinologist Felix
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Hospital in Berlin.  Käte Frankenthal (a former member of the Prussian Diet and Berlin City Council, and one of the
main SPD health policy specialists) and Kurt Glaser (a dermatologist who had been a long-serving SPD city
councillor) were also actively involved.  In the autumn of 1944, Boenheim, Frankenthal, and Glaser composed a draft
on medical and health policy issues.  It began by stating that the total destruction of all remnants of Nazism and
militarism was an obvious precondition for any democratic reconstruction. First measures would have to be directed
towards the containment of epidemics, both among the military and the civilian populations, for which adequate
provision of clean water, soup kitchens, basic food and medical supplies would be essential. It would also be crucial to
develop centralized medical clinics in each region, equipped with the necessary apparatus and the full range of medical
specialists. Destroyed hospital buildings would have to be rebuilt as soon as possible. Shortages in medical supplies
would have to be contained in the first instance by using stocks in German military depots. The authors anticipated a
shortage of doctors and trained medical personnel as the central problem. This could be overcome, they argued,
through the reinstatement of those sacked after 1933 for racial or political reasons, particularly those currently in exile
or imprisonment. This point was made repeatedly, but also generated the greatest disagreements with the future
occupiers.
In the spring of 1945, Glaser, Frankenthal, and Boenheim completed a more substantial memorandum on the
reconstruction of the German health system.  Beginning with a detailed description of Nazi reforms and the likely
state of the health service after the war, the authors listed measures which, they claimed, were not overly idealistic but
explicitly ‘practical’ and ‘pragmatic’, and which built upon the flourishing native German public health traditions
before 1933. Measures for the transitional post-war period mirrored those formulated earlier. It would be in the Allies’
interest, the authors argued, to maintain the health of the civilian population, since epidemics would not stop outside
the quarters of their own troops. There would be an immediate need for food, and released concentration camp victims
and political prisoners were to be given higher rations than the population at large. Basic utilities such as gas, water,
and electricity would have to be restored. Medical supply and services should be centralized into ‘treatment centres’.
In the 1920s, all three authors had been active in the multi-party Association of Socialist Doctors, and their 1945
memorandum developed many of those older ideas. They acknowledged the Beveridge Report, the work of the US
National Resources Planning Board, and the proposals of the American Public Health Association as important
influences on their proposals, but in substance their recommendations drew upon their interwar public health work in
Germany. They urged the formulation of a centrally directed, integrated, and socially oriented health policy. Proposals
included the creation of a central ministry of health and the replacement of the various insurance bodies by a single
new institution, run by the members themselves. Both demands had featured frequently in the association's work. They
recommended that insurance bodies become much more involved with preventive medicine, just as had partly been the
practice in 1920s Berlin. Other demands in this programme also rearticulated older concerns, such as a new kind of
occupational medicine. The ‘treatment centres’ were to become the main components of the new health system, in
which most important medical disciplines and specialities were to be represented and accessible. The programme also
contained recommendations on how the medical profession was to be dealt with under Allied control. The authors
unequivocally condemned Nazi medicine and argued that even in the face of the likely grave shortages of medical
personnel in post-war Germany, the temptation to relax denazification efforts would have to be resisted. Doctors’
responsibility for the barbarous acts that had been committed could not be ignored, they insisted, and their programme
demanded the strictest punishment and permanent controls, as well as a complete restructuring of the medical syllabus.
Similar plans were drawn up in other émigré quarters and outside the Free German groups. A second example is Dr
Hugo Freund, who in October 1945 approached the British Foreign Office with a proposal for the reconstruction of the
German health service.  Freund, a member of the SPD, had emigrated from Germany to Palestine in 1933, and, he
assured Philip Noel-Baker, certainly had enough experience with German public health: he had been in a leading
position in the German state health administration.  Although less detailed, his proposals mirrored the New York
programme. Freund, too, argued that the necessary emergency measures would have to be accompanied by a strategy
for a lasting reorientation of the public health system. Because the German population was likely to be at its physical
and psychological limits a properly coordinated health policy was crucial for the success of all other Allied measures.
Moreover, lessons would have to be learnt from the interwar years. While the health system developed after the First
World War contained a number of ‘progressive elements’, Freund argued, ‘in decisive points it proved to be
unsatisfactory and defective. The mistakes committed then must not be repeated once more.’ Failures included, above
all, the lack of a central ministry of health, and the over-representation of physician's interests particularly with regard
to the insurance funds, as a result of which ‘the great opportunity to develop a social physicianship was carelessly
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been] insufficient[ly] advised in questions of health policy’  but now, a uniform and centralized health policy could
be developed, not least because ‘progressive German doctors’ in exile were more than willing to assist the Allies. Their
first step should be the formation of a central health department, to oversee all further work. Strict denazification of the
medical profession was crucial, and new doctors should be appointed from among those who had been active before
1933, doctors like himself. Communal and social medicine was to become a compulsory component of the medical
syllabus, and all medical faculties ought to have chairs in this. Preventive medicine had to become the guiding
principle in health administration, Freund argued.
These two programmes diverged from, even clashed with, Allied decisions on many issues.  While Boenheim's group
and Hugo Freund argued for a centralized health organization, a major emphasis of Allied plans was one of
decentralization, and the country's division into zones had already been agreed. French policy-makers, in particular,
stressed the importance of decentralization, more so than the British, Americans, or Soviets. Apart from these
disagreements, however, both plans were essentially compatible with much of Allied occupation policy: they supported
the Allied occupation in principle; they emphasized the need for extensive denazification of the medical profession;
and they focused on some of the achievements of the public health system in 1920s Germany and wanted to redevelop
these traditions. The proposals were compatible with the notion of indirect control, but they disagreed most with the
occupiers’ intentions about the kinds of Germans to be appointed to the civilian authorities.
Two features are significant in these proposals. The first, which Chapter 4 will explore further, regards the émigrés’
perception of the significance of a number of German traditions, both medical and political, which they now tried to
develop; the health policy debates of the 1920s in particular were to form a starting point for future work. But secondly
and much more generally, they claimed to represent the better, and new, denazified Germany. Their appeals and
memoranda, regardless of their political affiliations, read as tracts on why émigrés were best suited to lead the
reconstruction efforts: they represented ‘the other Germany’, untainted by fascism and Nazism, and they had sampled
the ‘wealth of experience of democratic countries’.  They were, they said, the only Germans with any political
legitimacy and credibility. A memorandum by the Free League of Culture in Britain stated that help of ‘qualified and
conscientious’ émigrés in the ‘rebuilding of German civilisation’ was vital.  A later circular by the British Free
German group argued that in the necessary purge of Nazis and Nazi sympathizers, the return of antifascist refugees
would be crucial.  The message was clear: it was exiled Germans, the good Germans scattered across the globe, who
would be needed most once the war was over.
It was in this spirit that numerous émigré organizations and individuals contacted the various Allied authorities to offer
their services. As Niebergall put it: their work in France was done, and ‘Our place was now in Germany’.  The Free
German branches were particularly active organizers for the return of émigrés. In summer 1944, the British group sent
questionnaires to register those who were willing to return after the war and carry out ‘important jobs’.  In spring
1945, it announced in a press statement that it had ‘amongst its members lawyers, doctors, technicians and a
considerable number of persons with wide administrative experience. They all have fine anti-Nazi records to their
credit. Many of them are prepared to go to Germany at once to assist in the administration.’  In June 1945, Karl
Rawitzki, the group's chairman, presented the Foreign Office with a list of 567 people who were willing to return at
once. ‘All concerned are proven opponents of Nazism’, he wrote, and ‘many of them with a fine record of underground
work, others have spent years in concentration camps. Most of them have been officers of democratic institutions and
organisations. Some have years of practical experience behind them but there are also those whose lack of professional
qualifications will amply be compensated for by organisational and political experience in the fight against Nazism.’
He thought that their repatriation would alleviate the ‘scarcity of reliable anti-Nazi Germans in Germany itself’.
Wading through these letters and appeals, Foreign Office staff seemed grudgingly impressed by their organizational
efficiency and diligence. Commenting on Heinz Schmidt, secretary of the Free German movement in Britain, R. W.
Selby from the German Section of the Foreign Office minuted that ‘[h]e has pestered us a good deal about the return of
his refugees and he has the hide of a rhinoceros, but he has been extremely efficient’. Moreover, he thought, the ‘Free
German Movement’ had been ‘extremely efficient over this question [of repatriation], and the refugees who have
applied to them in connexion with their repatriation to Germany will undoubtedly have an advantage in effect over
refugees who have not’.
Numerous individuals also offered their services. Hugo Freund, who sent a plan for a new German public health
service, also applied to work in Germany. Freund felt, he said, ‘the obligation of submitting my services’ and
considered himself ‘the more justified as I have been a member of the Social Democracy (since 1912) and the trade
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information about my personality and political history.’  Other offers included those from three German doctors, Carl
Coutelle, Herbert Baer, and Rolf Becker, who were working as health officers with the Red Cross and the US army at
the war fronts in Burma and India, and who had run training schools for lay civilian personnel to deal with famine
conditions and epidemics—a scenario which they thought likely in Germany. All had served in the Spanish Republican
Army Medical Corps, and were seeking to work for the British authorities in the new Germany, in whichever
occupation zone or area they were needed most.
The American authorities received similar offers. One of many examples was that of the well-known lawyer Robert
Kempner, a former German government counsellor, who was twice detained in concentration camps before arriving in
the US in September 1939.  In March 1945, Kempner wrote to General Lucius Clay, Eisenhower's deputy in the
American occupation zone, with a list of German émigrés currently living in the US (some of whom had already been
naturalized), whom he considered to be potentially useful. The list included public health officials such as Franz
Goldmann, Alfred Korach, and Heinrich Brieger, as well as a number of welfare officers and health insurance
specialists. All of them, Kempner wrote, ‘possess invaluable personal contacts and inside information. Many of them
also have experience in U.S. Government service’, and all ‘were dismissed by the Hitler regime for political or racial
reasons and legally admitted to the U.S.’  Despite their political differences, these émigrés agreed on one thing: they
saw themselves as different from, and more legitimate than, the mass of Germans at home. But the future occupiers
disagreed.
Allied Policy
The problems faced by German émigrés were similar in all countries of exile. Unlike refugees from other nations, they
lacked a unifying centre and were unable to turn themselves into a homogenous, unified force. While there were
several attempts to organize broad groups, everywhere they were ridden by factionalism, particularly among the
various sections of the Left. Even more serious was the issue of legitimacy. The Nazis were not simply occupying their
home country; the reality of ‘the other Germany’, which the émigrés claimed to represent, remained contested. Many
Allied planners thought that active German participation in the decision-making process was to be avoided at all costs.
As a result, German émigrés did not establish themselves successfully or influentially in exile. At no point anywhere
was there a German government in exile; even a much more minor participation of émigrés was ruled out in principle.
But there were differences in the ways in which the four occupiers dealt with and utilized émigrés. The American and
British governments refused contact with the Free German groups on principle; political organizations such as the
British Labour Party went to some effort to distance themselves from them.  The French, although sceptical, were
willing to support at least some of those who shared French occupation aims. The Soviet authorities maintained steady
contact with the Free German Committee in Moscow throughout the later war years, and, after 1945, organized
repatriation drives for Free German members to Germany.
(i) Britain and the United States and German émigrés
Peter Ludlow and other historians have written persuasively on the ‘revolution in British foreign policy’ that took
place between 1938 and 1940. Appeasement tendencies were accompanied by a belief in the inherent reasonableness
of Germans. In response, people like Robert Vansittart emphasized the inherent unreasonableness of Germans, their
long-standing militarism and disregard of other peoples. In the context of this ‘general unwinding of appeasement’,
the prevalent views on the nature of the German character now made any serious distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
Germans obsolete, removing legitimacy from even the most active antifascist supporters of Allied aims. In the United
States, too, the possibility that émigrés, or at least some of them, could be useful in the post-war occupation
contradicted prevalent notions of what the Germans were like. Both countries used German émigrés as advisers to their
government authorities, but the idea of using them in Germany was something quite different. By 1941, the British and
American authorities approached the problem of Germany in essentially the same manner:  tied together in such
organizations as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and SHAEF, they were jointly committed to securing the military defeat
of Germany and its subsequent occupation. In both countries public opinion, if often confused, played a role, since
organizations such the British ‘Never Again Association’ and the American ‘Society for the Prevention of World War
Three’ drummed up some support for a harsh stance on Germany, and had some influential advocates.
Both countries also faced similar internal conflicts. The Roosevelt administration was fractured by a long-standing
debate about the relative spheres of responsibility of the State and the War Departments. This clash over the military as
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responsibility for the administration of Germany was frequently passed between them. As a result, both governments
were constrained by the prevailing uncertainty about the future of Germany and refused to commit themselves to any
specific directions too early, whether they involved émigrés or not. It was only clear that the needs of the German
civilians featured long after the requirements of Allied military governments, displaced persons, United Nations
nationals, and the demands of the military operations in the Far East.
British sources occasionally suggested that American policy was more lenient towards German émigrés, especially
with regard to their employment in advisory positions, and expressed concern that American authorities might be
exhibiting a dangerously ‘soft’ attitude. There were concerns over reports that the American military authorities had
been ‘whisking off’ some 300 German émigrés resident in the UK for jobs in Germany.  Or as Lt. Col. Thornley from
SOE wrote to the Foreign Office: although it had been agreed that ‘it was undesirable that political émigrés should be
allowed into the Occupied Zone at an early stage where they might be a source of considerable embarrassment’, he had
‘good reason to believe’ that the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was ‘asking various émigrés to proceed to Allied
Occupied territory (presumably the American Zone) in order “to combat the Nazi Underground movement, assist in the
reconstruction of German Trades Union, etc” ’.  Similarly, A British draft cabinet paper on the issue of repatriation
noted that the US seemed to have ‘adopted a different policy from ourselves in regard to the employment of German
refugees on their Control Commission’: they had ‘openly clothed German refugees (including many from the U.K.) in
American uniforms and sent them out to Germany for limited periods’, even if they had hitherto refrained from
repatriating them permanently.  Most of the cases mentioned here regarded émigrés who had acquired American
citizenship. During the first occupation years, American authorities in Germany did indeed seem to become more
relaxed about the use of returning émigrés than the British. But throughout the war and immediate post-war period,
British and American policy towards émigrés was fundamentally similar and shared a number of assumptions.
Many people in both the Foreign Office and the State Department saw German politicians in exile as representatives of
a failed political system. They were discouraged by the messiness of German politics, and particularly by the fact that
leftists were splintered into countless factions, none of whom were representative on their own. Even the New York
Council could not claim any mandate to represent German exiles, let alone Germans more generally. Another
consideration was that all contacts with this ‘other Germany’ were to be avoided so as not to come under suspicion of
planning a compromise peace or otherwise endangering the fragile anti-Hitler coalition. The fact that some of the
social democratic and conservative émigrés repeatedly warned about the Soviet Union made them troublesome, even if
British and American views on communist affiliations were often no different.  Most of all, any promises that would
limit future freedom of action were to be avoided. For a while, it still seemed possible that Hitler could be overthrown
by Wehrmacht generals, and they were not to be discouraged; and a delegation of exiled leftist antifascists would seem
absurd to them. By the time an internal German resistance had been ruled out, cooperation with Germans had become
even more inadvisable.
The Churchill government rejected a compromise peace and began a general distancing from émigré groups in Britain,
which was shared by American officials once they joined the war. Political developments in Germany were now
analysed purely with the aim of weakening Germany militarily, and so even conservative émigrés lost their political
attraction. Official opinion in both countries was opposed to the idea of negotiating with any anti-Nazi groups, either
inside Germany or through exiled Germans. Although in many points émigré plans were compatible with Allied
schemes, policy considerations dictated that no use of émigrés could be made.While in practise the British and
American authorities’ refusal to recognize the Free German groups had a clear anticommunist rationale,  their
relationship to other émigré groups was little different. The multitude of socialist, centrist, and liberal German émigré
groups, among them vocal anticommunists, experienced the same treatment. The SPD in exile, which, after a period in
Prague and Paris set up its headquarters in London in 1941, or the German People's Socialist Movement, were treated
essentially no different than the Free Germans.  British and American refusal to work with or recognize German
émigré groups extended far beyond a suspicion of communists.
The archives of the British and American authorities document that, from the start, officials refused to draw a
consistent distinction between émigrés and Germans at large. Many enemy aliens in Britain first encountered such a
lack of distinction in the internment scare of spring 1940. Although throughout 1939 tribunals had assessed hundreds
of thousands of enemy aliens and allocated them into one of three security categories, after the fall of Holland and the
ensuing fifth column panic, many of those who had been assessed as safe were interned together with those of medium
and serious risk, and in the makeshift internment camps Nazis and Nazi-sympathizers were now assembled together
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between different kinds of Germans collapsed. Similarly, as far as émigrés were concerned, there were no attempts to
group them into different categories of reliability or usefulness.
As Con O’Neill, Foreign Office adviser on Germany, explained in his memorandum entitled ‘Talking Points’: ‘Talking
good and bad Germans misses the point. Of course they are not all bad. But the trouble is that the vast majority of them
are indifferent. Only, they have a deeply ingrained proclivity to respect authority, no matter how acquired; to admire
the use of force, no matter for what purpose; to ask no questions; and to accept no responsibilities. The Germans are
the weakest people in the world—morally.’ A direct corollary was to prevent any ‘influence of émigrés’, since, O’Neill
argued, to ‘expect an impartial or unprejudiced opinion from an émigré is like expecting grapes from a pear tree’.
Because they were ‘Germans first and émigrés second’, they might be conditioned to ‘work against the regime that
kicked them out, but they’ll never work against Germany’. Their expulsion from Germany was no guarantee of an anti-
German position, and there were no reliable groups among the émigrés. The German Jews, O’Neill wrote, ‘always
were the most patriotic Germans, and they will be again—what's left of them’. Claims of underground resistance were
similarly unreliable: there ‘is not and has never been a German “Underground movement”. It's a pure legend invented
by the German émigrés.’
Neither here nor in other statements of this nature was it acknowledged that Jews could not actually be ‘German’
according to Nazi racial criteria, or that any real opposition to Germany was possible from those who had been rejected
by and expelled from Germany. The fact that this was not simply a public façade is documented by comparable
statements in the privacy of Foreign Office minutes, such as the rhyming minute below, which evocatively illustrates
the prevalent British approach. It responded to the application by a Mr Sass, a former managing director of the
Rheinwerke in Düsseldorf, now in exile in Columbia, to work for the British control authorities:
From Africa's shore, from Colombia's sun-drenched strand
Urgent there streams an eager Hebrew band.
Imbued with pure desire to serve their aims
Of Allied justice, see them stake their claims
To jobs in Germany. They know the ropes.
And their control will answer all our hopes.
‘Let us but serve, and we will prove our worth.
‘Till Hitler came and rudely thrust us forth
‘We helped the men who laid the powder train,
‘So you can trust us not to help again.
‘Good Germans, we? Perhaps, but all the same,
‘Profit or lose, we’ll play the allies’ game.’
Such altruistic offers shall we spurn,
Nor rather, trusting, to these helpers turn.
Loose them like vultures on the German scene
And hope they will not pick the carcass clean
Or, worse, revert to type and aid the Hun
To germanise the world with tank and gun?
Prudence invites we leave them where they are
And hitch our wagon not to David's star …
Apart from its anti-Semitic undertones, statements such as these contained a particular notion of German nationalism:
not evidence of a certain kind of political engagement, but an invariable constant exhibited by all Germans by their
very nature. Their political affiliations only came second. The harder the émigrés protested against this kind of analysis
and the more altruistic their offers to help seemed, the more suspect they became.
Cooperation with any émigrés or émigré faction was also seen as inadvisable and undesirable because of the public
relations problems that would entail. As a Foreign Office minute spelled out, the government would ‘certainly have
parliamentary difficulties if we started this sort of thing … Unless there is something very concrete to gain it is a
mistake to commit ourselves to any German body.’  When the Free Germans submitted their lists of people willing to
return and work in Germany, a Foreign Office minute stated, somewhat regretfully, that the ‘list would be quite useful
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Émigré medical personnel were not excluded from this blanket rejection. When the Public Health Branch of the British
Control Commission for Germany suggested it get in touch with the Free German Institute of Science, which was
reported to have compiled dossiers of German doctors and scientist waiting to return after the war, the Foreign Office
warned against this contact. Troutbeck, another Foreign Office adviser, stated that while the institute ‘may well be an
estimable body’,
whether or not it has a recognisable political colour itself, it is affiliated with other organisations which definitely
have. It is indeed almost inevitable that émigré organisations, even if predominantly technical in their interests,
should have a political tinge. This being so I am afraid we should not like to see any initiative taken by the British
Element in order to obtain the advice of the Institute. I may say for your future guidance that we see objection in
general to consulting émigré groups or institutions. Apart from the point I have already made, it is undesirable
that these bodies should gain the impression that they are in our confidence, or that they or their members can
count on any official consideration for their interests in the future.
The Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (SPSL), a British charity involved in the placement of refugee
academics in positions in Britain and abroad, directed by notables such as William Beveridge, Henry Dale, and
Friedrich von Hayek, had some contact with the British Control Commission in spring and summer 1945. The
secretary had prepared lists for the Public Health Branch of displaced university medical teachers registered with the
SPSL, a fact which he—unlike the British and American authorities—regarded as ‘prima facie evidence of [their]
reliability’.  But after an initial welcome of such work, contact soon lapsed, and the secretary was eventually
informed by the Control Commission that ‘a high level decision here has ruled against direct contact with refugees’.
Underneath this rhetoric, a number of more subtle analyses of émigrés were coming together as the war wore on. Apart
from the problem of their representativeness, British officials argued that these émigrés were ‘out of touch with
developments in Germany’.  The psychiatrist Henry Dicks, who later worked for the British Control Commission in
Germany, expressed this well:
The old democratic trade-unionist may well be found to be useless, to cut no ice, in a community as disrupted as
Germany will be. His very aloofness from the process of bitter disenchantment through which his people have
passed, may have made him into an anachronism, a sort of émigré. It can be said that the émigré, or the political
deserter, is not often the foundation of a new beginning, useful though he may be, and congenial as his views may
be to us.
On these grounds, émigré preparations were neither useful nor necessary. As one official observed, past experiences
showed that the British had ‘no reason to think that such material will prove useful and there is no reason to believe
that the Free German Movement are better qualified than the various Departments of H.M.G to undertake work of this
kind’.  Some also rejected the notion that émigrés could be anything other than passive guests. As A. V. Hill
countered the claim that German émigré scientists had ‘played their role in the fight against fascism’: ‘They didn’t take
part in the fight except as victims for the most part. They were sacked, robbed and persecuted.’
As a result, when individual requests for employment and offers to assist in reconstruction tasks were received by the
British and American authorities, the vast majority were rejected. Of course, both the British and American
governments did make some use of émigrés in advisory capacities, particularly in their psychological propaganda
efforts.  But while émigrés worked for institutions as the American Office of Strategic Services, the British Foreign
Office Research Department, and the BBC, in practice German politicians in British or American exile were impotent
and helpless. Most of their initiatives were ignored and they had no influence on any of the central political decisions
of the time.
Many individual cases document this policy. Hugo Freund, who had submitted a plan for the reconstruction of the
health service, was told in November 1945 that little could be done to grant his request to help in Germany.  By May
1946, he had still not been successful and his plan was simply filed away.  The list of German health officials in the
United States experienced a similar fate, and none of the public health officials on this list returned to Germany.  The
three Germans in Burma—Rolf Becker, Carl Coutelle, and Herbert Baer—faced similar difficulties, even after the
British China Medical Committee took up their case. ‘We have had nothing but praise of their work and their integrity
from the Chinese Red Cross, the U.S. Army and the Friends Ambulance Unit who have worked alongside them’, their
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work in their own countries. And since Europe is short of doctors and we really have none to spare here it would seem
more sensible to get these doctors back again.’  But the committee was told that one possible employer, UNRRA, was
ruled out by the fact that it would not employ Germans, ‘no matter how good their qualifications are’,  and because of
transport shortages it was at any rate ‘not yet possible for German and Austrian refugees to return to their countries’.
Nor could the doctors travel through Britain as the Home Office refused to issue them transit visas.  As the MP
Kenneth Younger observed, ‘the British are not particularly interested in employing these men either in China or
Germany at the moment. No doubt transport is difficult but it has not been suggested that that is the real obstacle to
their return to Germany.’
Another case was that of Dr Lucie Adelsberger. She was a specialist in internal medicine and immunology, and an
Auschwitz survivor. During a period of recuperation in Holland she applied for jobs at medical schools in the USA.
But when told that it was unlikely that they would employ a middle-aged German when there was ample supply of
young American medical students, she decided to seek employment in Germany, with the British Control Commission,
UNRRA, or similar organizations. Via the SPSL, who had taken up her case, she, too, received the by-now-familiar
rejection. ‘[T]hey tell us rigidly that they cannot employ Germans or Austrians’, wrote the SPSL secretary, and
commented that in ‘a case like this it is manifestly foolish and wrong’.  A referee from the Harvard Medical School
wrote to UNRRA in protest: ‘She is a German; obviously she is not a Nazi. She is in complete sympathy with the
Allies and the principles of democracy. She is very much on our side.’  None of this mattered.
The British and especially the American armies contained a number of individuals of German origins, now naturalized,
who temporarily worked for the occupation authorities, before returning to Britain or the United States. But for many
others even temporary work in Germany proved impossible because of the difficulty of obtaining permits. Dr Hans
Schlossmann, a former lecturer at the Pharmacological Institute of the Düsseldorf Medical Academy, who had been
dismissed on racial grounds and who had lived in Britain since 1934, tried in January 1946 to go with a team of
biochemists to the British zone to advise the occupation authorities on nutrition problems, but ‘was eventually turned
down because he was not yet naturalised’.  Those who had become naturalized Allied citizens were often in no better
situation. The SPSL was in September 1946 dealing with the case of a German émigré, already an American citizen,
who wanted to accept a guest appointment at the University of Hamburg, but had been told that there was ‘no
likelihood of citizens of Allied countries being allowed to take up employment in Germany Universities. The question
has been under discussion for some time, but no satisfactory solution has been found as it involves the employment of
Allied Nationals by German Masters, which is a major difficulty under the existing conditions of Control.’  Nor could
he simply become a German citizen again, ‘since grant of nationality is always a discretionary matter, and there is at
present no central authority for Germany which could exercise such discretion’.
The involvement of the China Medical Committee illustrates that it did not make much difference whether the émigrés
had British or American sponsors or not. Dr Hugo Freund was apparently supported by the MP Richard Crossmann;
others by other MPs and political figures, but to no avail.  Roger Wilson of the Society of Friends was in the same
situation: in September 1945 he tried to organize a relief mission to Germany, and approached the Foreign Office with
the suggestion to use Germans currently in Britain. Relief work would have to fall more and more upon the Germans,
he wrote, and the society knew at least a hundred suitable people with whom they had worked since 1933. He urged
Bevin to give ‘urgent attention’ to ‘the possible use of people of German nationality for relief work under the auspices
of British voluntary societies in Germany’.  However, he was told repeatedly that even when Germans with the right
qualifications had been found and no suitable Englishmen were available, it was still impossible to employ them in
Germany.
These examples put the later observation by occupation officials such as Robert Murphy, who expressed surprise and
dissatisfaction at not having enough German-speakers who could be assigned to administrative posts in Germany, into
a new light.  The debate over the employment of returning émigrés continued well into the occupation, and even
after the Americans seemed to have relaxed their opposition somewhat.  In June 1946, General Clay commented in a
letter that ‘[i]n the functional field, we have recruited a number of men of German origin and some of them have
proved to be very good indeed. However, much depends on what is meant by German origin. If these men are second
or third generation Americans, their knowledge of Germany is usually very remote even though they may speak the
language.’ In this context,
The Germany refugee who left Germany to go to the United States and subsequently became a citizen of the
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understand Germany better than America and, as such, fail to represent America in Germany. It is difficult to
estimate their reactions on their return to Germany, as, in fact, it will vary from the reaction of Dr. Brandt, who
became extremely sympathetic to the German plight and an open opponent of Potsdam, to the view of Professor
Lowenstein in our Legal Division who believes that the re-education and democratisation of Germany are
completely hopeless.
In April 1947, in the context of a review of the continued employment of Germans who had acquired American
citizenship and worked for OMGUS in any capacity, the deputy military governor Major-General Keating paraphrased
Clay's view of German émigrés as being politically unreliable, stating that ‘many of these individuals have not been
sufficiently indoctrinated in American ideologies to warrant their retention in our employment. It is anticipated that,
with few exceptions, their contracts will be terminated.’
(ii) France and German émigrés
France was in a very different position to Britain and the United States. On the one hand it had long been a major
country of refuge for people fleeing fascism and Nazism. By 1936, 2.2 million foreign refugees lived within France.
German refugees often went first to France, before moving on eventually to Britain or the United States, if they could
overcome American immigration restrictions. Politically active German émigrés of many affiliations, who had been
coming to France since 1933 and the reintegration of the Saar into Germany in 1935, were well organized in bodies
such as the Central Association of German Emigration (Zentralvereinigung der deutschen Emigration), which
represented twenty-two émigré groups in France, and which was recognized in October 1938 by the League of Nations
as an official representation of German refugees.  Many exiled political parties set up their headquarters in Paris,
where a number of French parties and trade unions had declared their solidarity with the German exiles. These
favourable conditions for political collaboration with German émigrés seemed to prosper further when Léon Blum's
Popular Front government was elected in May 1936.
But on the other hand, France was the first of the future occupiers to be attacked and invaded, and the only one to be
fully occupied by Germany and partly run by a collaborationist government. It did not take part in the important Allied
wartime conferences; it did not officially become an occupying power until 1944; and the borders of its occupation
zone were not finally settled until the summer of 1945.  Its post-Vichy government, a multi-party coalition which
contained communists, socialists, and Christian democrats, was unelected for over a year. Throughout this time, the
country was riven by deep internal struggles—between the Vichy regime and the Free French, between followers of
General de Gaulle and General Giraud, and between the various factions of the Left and the Right. Like the Anglo-
American planners, those in Paris had to negotiate conflicting spheres of responsibility between the military and the
civilian authorities, but France was at the same time marred by far more acute divisions and uncertainties over future
policies.
As a result, the French position on German émigrés was less categorical than the British or American. After the
outbreak of war, German refugees were interned indiscriminately and regardless of their political affiliations.  It is
also true that public support for German exiles in France waned radically after 1939, and many public figures shared
Anglo-American views of German nationalism and militarism. But where émigrés in Britain and the United States
failed to be recognized as legitimate representatives of an alternative to Nazism, a number of German groups in France
had more success. CALPO was not just closely connected with institutions and networks of the PCF and the trade
union movement, it was also recognized as an official resistance organization, and its members fought alongside the
French forces on the western front and in the battle for Paris.  The group, and many individual members, were
recognized as Resistance fighters, and a number of French figures vocally supported them. In October 1944, in a
speech in Toulouse, Vincent Auriol—head of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Consultative Assembly, and later to
become first president of the Fourth Republic—emphasized CALPO's contribution to the speedy capitulation of
German troops on French soil.
Nonetheless, by late 1944 and early 1945, CALPO's relations with the French authorities began to deteriorate, and
eventually France declined cooperation with CALPO on post-war Germany. By February 1945 the French Foreign
Ministry laid down the line that authorities had to show greater distance from CALPO, and all embassies were
instructed to maintain distance towards German émigré organizations and to enquire discreetly about their political
orientation.  The group's activities were increasingly supervised, restricted, and ultimately prohibited, until it was
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affiliations, since (unlike in Britain and America) support of the Soviet Union alone did not warrant suspicion. Until
1947 it was a major pillar of French foreign policy to mediate between Soviet and Anglo-American approaches.
Why did French officials have doubts about CALPO? At least in part their response can be understood as an effort to
bring French policy in line with American and British standards and to assure them, often still sceptical about France's
role as an occupying power, that it was up to the job.  The distancing from CALPO was also partly testimony to the
increased marginalization of French communists in occupation affairs. As in Britain and America, there were real
worries about a premature commitment to any particular German faction which would limit future freedom to operate.
All these factors offer partial reasons for the French position on CALPO, but the most important was a clash with
crucial elements of the French agenda. As CALPO began to agitate for a reconstructed, centralized, and unified
Germany, it contradicted the basic security premise of French policy. France's central priority was that the defeated
Germany had to be radically and permanently decentralized (perhaps even dismembered), and militarily and
economically weakened. The proclamations by members of CALPO and other émigré groups (such as the SPD in
exile) on a future centralized country—even if it was demilitarized and denazified—were thus entirely unacceptable in
French officials’ eyes. These proclamations represented, they argued, Germans’ desire to see Germany ‘regain its full
place in the sun, even, if possible, in the distant future, and the realisation of the aims of Hitler and his followers’.
French views on CALPO's plans for Germany were to a large degree shaped by its concerns about the shape of post-
war Germany. Their increasingly negative position was further entrenched by the arrival of members of the Swiss Free
German group in the territory of the French occupation zone in the last weeks of the war, who began to agitate for
centralized German reconstruction.  Like other Free German groups, the Swiss movement called not just for the
arrest of all war criminals, the denazification of German authorities, and the democratization of German public life, but
also demanded the ‘recovery of the German people's sovereignty’ and the ‘unity of the Reich, under free development
of the historically determined particularities of the German regions’.  Where the Free Germans fought ‘for the
salvation of the German nation’,  French occupation policy was to prevent just that—there was to be no salvation of
the nation and no unity of the Reich, and the German particularities were to be suppressed and remoulded. To the
French authorities, these émigrés were therefore not simply representatives of the failed Weimar regime, but, more
disturbingly, they continued to share the basic premises of German unity, centralization, and German recovery
represented in both Bismarck's and Hitler's world views. The French official position towards the Free German
émigrés was thus not the product of a blanket rejection of the use of émigrés, but a calculated move.
The fact that the French authorities evaluated the degree to which the émigrés’ programmes matched their own
priorities, rather than refusing cooperation on principle, is demonstrated by evidence that they utilized those
individuals and groups who supported French policy, and were politically useful to it. A revealing (even if peculiar)
case is that of the Saar, a region which had changed hands several times between Germany and France, but which had
been under German control since the plebiscite of 1935, and was now part of the French occupied territory in
Germany. The Saar became something of an ‘émigré state’ even before it was given autonomous status and was
economically integrated into France after 1947.  Gilbert Grandval, who in August 1945 became the Saar's military
governor, found in the returning émigrés a useful means to strengthen the cooperation between his military and their
civilian administrations, and from the start they assumed vital positions in the Saar civilian authorities.  The German
Catholic democrat Johannes Hoffmann, a vocal opponent of the return of the Saar to Germany in 1935, had emigrated
first to France and then to Brazil, where he kept in close contact with members of the French Resistance. In September
1945, he returned to Saarbrücken via Paris with help from the Interministerial Committee on German and Austrian
Affairs (Comité Interministériel des Affaires Allemandes et Autrichiennes, CIAAA)—the new liaison office between
the French occupation authorities in Germany and the ministries in Paris. Shortly afterwards he became head of the
newly licensed Christian People's Party of the Saar (CVP), and later minister president of the Saar.  Hoffmann was
no isolated example. More émigrés were appointed to the new Saar administrative commission after the first
communal elections on 8 October 1946, among them Richard Kirn as director for work and welfare, and Emil Straus as
director for education. German émigrés also played a vital role in the political parties of the Saar; most of them—such
as the CVP, the Social Democratic Party (SPS), and the Communist Party (KPS)—were in fact run by returning
émigrés.  Another influential political movement run by émigrés was the Mouvement pour la Libération de la Sarre
(MLS), founded in March 1945 by German exiles in Paris, and which demanded the complete annexation of the Saar
by France. Members of this movement, and its later reincarnation as the Mouvement pour la Rattachement de la Sarre
à la France (MRS), were appointed by the military authorities to a number of influential positions.  In all these cases,
the preference for émigrés was a component of the French political programme for the Saar, which included calls for
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The French authorities’ relationships with German political émigrés were thus shaped by their support of French
policies. A party which initially did not share this programme and which did not have an émigré leader, the DPS
(Democratic Party of the Saar), was licensed later than the other parties, only after Grandval and his staff had coaxed
its leaders into agreement with a separation of the Saar. Conversely, the émigré-headed parties of the Saar (except for
the KPS) had from the start assured their compliance with French occupation policy in the Saar.  CALPO, by
contrast, disagreed over the issue of the separation and decentralization in the Saar, and founded its own organization
for Saar refugees, and trained its members for administrative duties there, without abandoning its calls for the full
integration of the Saar with the rest of Germany.  The importance of émigrés’ affinity with the French occupation
programme as a precondition for their political success is also illustrated by those CALPO members who did return to
the Saar, but left again thereafter—such as Otto Niebergall, CALPO's president, who was expelled by the military
authorities in 1947 and moved to Rheinland-Pfalz (a different Land in the French zone), and Fritz Nickolay, who
presided over the KPS, but moved to the GDR in 1950 after being accused of causing public unrest at a May Day
demonstration.
Elsewhere in the French zone, there were few returning émigrés in leading administrative positions, proportionately
even fewer than in the British and American zones. In the media the numbers were surprisingly low: only 7.6 per cent
of all returning émigrés who worked in the media went to the French zone, compared to over 40 per cent in the Soviet
zone, 26 per cent in the American zone, and almost 17 per cent in the British.  The French zone's health authorities,
too, were not significantly shaped by émigrés. Since French policy prioritized decentralization, this absence of émigrés
can be explained to a large degree by the fact that the main German political parties and movements—unlike those in
the Saar—had no history of lobbying for separation or decentralization of the cobbled-together regions in the French
zone. In fact, in all zones (apart from the Saar) both the SPD and the KPD opposed any decentralization or
dismemberment of Germany, and continually tried to develop inter-zonal party programmes. Similarly, German
doctors active in the SPD or KPD had since the 1920s argued for greater centralization in the German health service
and the establishment of a central ministry of health. In the French case, this, rather than any communist affiliations,
would have made them extremely unpopular with the occupation authorities.
A revealing exception in the French zone's health sector is the case of Frédéric Falkenburger, a German Jewish doctor
who had studied medicine at the University of Strasbourg before the First World War, and subsequently worked in
Berlin in a venereal disease clinic and local health insurance body. He emigrated to France in 1933. In 1936–7 he spent
some time working in Moscow, before returning to France and taking French citizenship in 1937. In the same year he
also began to work at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in Paris. He returned to Germany in
1945 as an officer in the French military government's Public Health Branch in Baden-Baden. Later he became head of
the health service of the French high commissioner in Germany, and was for some time based at both the universities
of Mainz and Paris.  His value to the French authorities was no doubt highlighted by the fact that he had been
educated at French institutions, and was bilingual and naturalized. Like Maxim Zetkin in the Soviet zone, Falkenburger
was an ‘intermediary’ between French and German officials, and unlike most other Germans who came back in French
uniform and as French citizens, Falkenburger continued to work in Germany until his death.
(iii) The Soviet Union and German émigrés
The Soviet scenario was different again. The community of political exiles in the Soviet Union was much more
homogenous in its interests than those in France, Britain, or the United States. German representatives in the
Comintern's executive committee estimated in 1936 that of the roughly 4,600 Germans with ‘political émigré’ status,
the vast majority were communists. In 1938 and 1939 their number was increased further by the arrival of communists
who had fought in the Spanish Civil War or who came from French internment camps.  Because of non-communists’
reluctance to emigrate to the Soviet Union—and even if they did, because of countless problems in being granted
asylum status and establishing themselves in exile —there were fewer competing factions among the political
émigrés. Doctors were strongly represented among both the communist émigrés and those who initially arrived as
‘Jewish’ refugees, and many were employed in the Soviet health service to alleviate a serious shortage of doctors.
Whereas in Britain and America German doctors often had to retrain and requalify before they could work, here they
were easily absorbed. This proved particularly important for the post-war years because, at least in German eyes,
émigré doctors were valuable in the future German reconstruction after the war. As Lothar Wolf—himself a communist
doctor from Berlin, and in exile in the Soviet Union since 1934—explained to Wilhelm Pieck: ‘the emigration and use
of such a large number of doctors has a great political significance (not just in terms of health policy) for the KPD and
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The émigrés faced undeniable difficulties in Soviet exile. They had to undergo rigorous checks into their past and
present activities. Only a minority of them were based in Moscow, while many more were scattered across the Soviet
Union, including Siberia.  They had to stay silent during the German–Soviet pact, many had died in Spain, and
many more were deported or executed during the Stalinist purges. Lothar Wolf was arrested by the state security
service (NKVD) in 1937 and died shortly afterwards. His wife Martha Ruben-Wolf, also a politically active doctor
from Berlin, committed suicide in 1939.  There were many similar cases. Nonetheless, Soviet policy on the use of
German nationals for future work in Germany was more flexible than that of Britain and the United States. The Soviet
government supported and worked with those émigrés who were useful to its priorities in Germany, even more actively
than the French. A number of exiles were able to draw upon older émigré infrastructures, such as political groups, as
well as some of the institutional remainders left behind by the German minorities in the Soviet Union (newspapers,
periodicals, publishing houses, and theatres).  And just as communist émigrés in France benefited from their
connections to the French Communist Party, émigrés here were more embedded in Soviet political institutions and
networks than those in either British or American exile—in the orbits of the Comintern, the Soviet Communist Party's
training schools, universities, and the Red Army.
The recognition that émigrés could be of assistance to the occupying powers was thus not at issue. The situation was in
some ways simpler than it was in the West. Many communists, émigrés and Russians alike, agreed with a distinction in
principle between the German working class, who suffered under the small clique of Nazis and who had been used as
cannon fodder to fight their war, and those responsible for the war. For many non-communists, this distinction between
apparently good and bad Germans was much harder or even impossible to maintain. A diary entry by Georgy Dimitrov
offers a glimpse of this position. In 1938, in the context of developments in Czechoslovakia, he commented that ‘a
nation is not some gang of traitors willing for the sake of its class privileges to offer up its own people to be torn to
pieces by German fascism. A nation is millions of workers and peasants, working people, who are being betrayed by
the Chamberlains and Daladiers.’
In discussions with German comrades in subsequent years, Dimitrov applied this notion to Germany. A diary entry
from January 1943 recorded a meeting with Wilhelm Pieck and the German writer Johannes R. Becher, both of whom
he advised to be clear about the differences between the Nazis and the German population at large—if not from
conviction then for reasons of political expediency: ‘I explained to Becher’, he wrote, ‘that it is politically inexpedient
to represent the German people in its entirety as corrupt, with bad and dangerous qualities. You have to differentiate
and show the positive qualities to be found in the depths of the German people, on the strength of which the German
people could rise up and rid themselves of the Hitlerite clique, washing away their shame and the bad and dangerous
qualities. There is a need for serious national self-criticism, but not for indiscriminate self-flagellation.’  In March
1945, Dimitrov noted that while Hitler was trying to drag ‘the German populace down with him into the abyss’, what
they needed was ‘for some Germans to appear who are capable of salvaging what could still be salvaged for the
survival of the German people. Organise the municipality … , re-establish the economy, etc., on the German territory
taken and occupied by the Red Army. Establish local government agencies out of which would eventually develop a
German government’.
In addition to being willing to distinguish between good and bad Germans (or at least between those who were useful
and those who were not), Comintern officials had long been involved in the German Communist Party, whose leading
individuals identified themselves as communists first and Germans second. Although the Comintern was officially
disbanded in 1943—just days before the formation of the NKFD—its equipment and operations were taken over by a
number of Soviet agencies, and aspects of its approach informed official activities. Soviet priorities at this point lay
strictly with winning the war and conducting military operations, but their interests overlapped with those of the
Comintern, not least because the lack of preparations for the occupation dictated that they use Germans’ help in
rebuilding Germany wherever they could.  This was also exactly what Ulbricht and the KPD leadership had in mind.
The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party had, at any rate, long been involved in the training of German
communists who were in Soviet exile, and memoirs of the period of exile in the Soviet Union often record the many
training schools and cadre programmes.
Some time before the French authorities (and in contrast to those in London and Washington), the Soviet government
decided to make use of German émigrés for the implementation of their German policy. Where in France it was
émigrés’ affinity with the French occupation agenda that mattered most, Soviet officials were more interested in
broader questions of political reliability and party training. With the plurality and changeability of Soviet plans for the
future occupation, insisting on adherence to any principles was not very practical.  Even after Stalin's proclamations
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not rule out a collaboration with German émigrés. Throughout the war they maintained close contacts with people such
as Pieck and Ulbricht. Although by the end of the war Dimitrov was not as influential as he had been in the late 1930s,
through him something of the old Comintern mentality found its way into the spring 1945 preparations for the Soviet
administration of their German zone. Significantly, it was Dimitrov (himself a Bulgarian) who regularly met the
Germans, as well as all the other national groups of the Comintern, to discuss their future tasks. When in November
1943 a group of German émigrés came to see him about a range of German issues, he ‘[B]rought to their attention’, he
wrote in his diary, ‘that they are to proceed on the basis of the most likely prospect, the destruction of fascist Germany
under the blows of the armed forces of the Sov[iet] Union and its allies, [and] thereafter the temporary occupation of
Germany, with all the ramifications of this fact. Therefore the task of the German Com[munist] party (as regards the
postwar period) lies first of all in creating the sort of organised national force that, with the help of the Soviet Union,
would be capable of taking upon itself the rebirth of Germany as a genuinely democrat[ic] country.’  During the last
days of the war, it was primarily Dimitrov who, with the help of Pieck and Ulbricht, prepared lists for Stalin of the
German émigrés and POWs who were to be sent back for work in the occupied territory.  When the Red Army
approached the German border, Pieck made a formal request to Dimitrov to send a group of German communists with
the Red Army to liberate Berlin. Dimitrov approved this, and on his recommendation the Central Committee sent three
groups to Germany, one with each of the major armies.  During June 1945, roughly 70 German communists and 300
POWs from the antifascist schools were sent back to Germany for administrative work.
After Germany's unconditional surrender, the Free Germany committee in Moscow was disbanded and many of its
members were appointed to positions in the state and security apparatus of the Soviet zone in Germany. Local
administrations were put into the hands of returning émigrés, most of whom had been members of the NKFD or active
in its orbit, in the antifascist schools, or in some of the other organizations mentioned above. Maxim Zetkin was among
those who returned from Moscow to Berlin in 1945, and participated in the construction of the Soviet zone's Central
Health Administration. As its vice-president, he was responsible for the all-important organizational and personnel
matters, as well as for liaison with the Soviet Military Administration. Zetkin, perhaps even more so than
Falkenburger, was a useful ‘intermediary’, because he was known in both Soviet and German circles. As Max Klesse
(a colleague of Zetkin's in Berlin) noted in October 1946, ‘from the returning émigrés only the name of Zetkin was
known well by all Germans, even by non-communists, and—this is more important still—was revered everywhere.
Ulbricht, Wandel, and Wintzer, who in spite of their intelligence and engagement were not widely known, would have
acquired resonance, especially among the German proletariat, if associated with Zetkin's name.’
Nor were Soviet initiatives to bring back émigrés and appoint them to key positions restricted to those in Soviet exile.
Officially sanctioned returns included the arrival of a large group of KPD functionaries from Scandinavia in January
1946,  of communists from Mexican exile in May 1946, and of some communists from Britain in the summer of
1946. Many of the individuals active in the orbits of the Free German groups ended up in the Soviet zone/GDR. Heinz
Schmidt returned from the UK in 1946, together with his Austrian wife Eva Schmidt-Kolmer, who joined the Central
Health Administration. Rudolf Neumann came back from Mexico in 1947, and became Oberarzt at the Hufeland
Hospital in Berlin. Kurt Winter arrived from Sweden in 1945, and after working as a district physician in Teltow
directed the Brandenburg public health department and subsequently became a vice-president of the Central Health
Administration. Felix Boenheim returned from the United States and went to Leipzig in 1948, where he became a
professor for internal medicine and director of the Medizinisch-Poliklinisches Institut at the University of Leipzig. Rolf
Becker, Carl Coutelle, and Herbert Baer all returned in 1948 and worked in the Central Health Administration and in
other leading capacities in the health service.  Conversely, those who had to rely on support from the British,
American, or French authorities often did not return. Käte Frankenthal, Franz Goldmann, Alfred Korach, and Heinrich
Brieger all remained in the United States.  Lucie Adelsberger also did not manage to get into Germany and moved to
the United States.  The only exceptions of émigrés in this chapter who flourished in the British or American zones
are Robert Kempner, who assisted the US chief counsel during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and
worked temporarily at the German Foreign Office (but never settled permanently in Germany), and Kurt Glaser, who
returned in 1948 and later joined the local health service in Hamburg, and later still became a member of the Federal
Health Council (Bundesgesundheitsrat) in the FRG.
Conclusions
At the same time as the Allied governments began to draw up plans for the post-war period and their dealings with
Germany, German émigrés across the world tried to take part. In the many branches of the Free German groups, and in


















future occupying powers to be allowed to participate. Their relations with the British, American, French, and Soviet
authorities were consequently often fraught. The Big Four dealt with them very differently. The British and American
governments formally refused to acknowledge a distinction between Germans at large and those who had emigrated, or
between different sections of the émigré community. They viewed them as ineffective and out of touch with
developments in Germany, and insisted that cooperation with them was politically undesirable. Both the Soviet and the
French governments, by contrast, proved more willing to differentiate between different kinds of Germans. Partly this
was a result of émigrés’ closer links with a number of Soviet and French political institutions (and the absence of those
associations in Britain and the United States), and especially in France it reflected internal divisions. To some degree it
was also a feature of the greater requirement for collaborators by the two occupying powers who were most in need of
material and political support. As a result, the Soviet authorities recognized some émigrés as a potentially useful means
to advance Soviet aims. French authorities made similar calculations and made use of émigrés who supported their
policies of separation and decentralization in the territory of the Saar, and to a lesser degree in other parts of their
occupation zone.
None of the three western occupation zones (apart from the region of the Saar) showed great numbers of returning
émigrés in leading positions, but this observation disguises significant differences between them. In the French case it
was a feature of the disagreements between French and German views on the future of Germany, whereas in the other
two western zones it was rooted in a blanket rejection of cooperation with the émigrés and their claim to represent ‘the
other Germany’. Conversely, the vast majority of returning émigrés worked in the Soviet zone and in the Saar, and in
both cases the occupiers had decided early on that the émigrés were useful for their own agendas. Where British and
American planners justified their decisions by pointing to likely tensions between the returning émigrés and the native
population, the Soviet and French authorities were most concerned about the Germans’ relationships with the
occupation authorities, and some also saw the potential of émigrés to convert and teach the German population. In all
four cases, the Allies’ position on German émigrés appeared as a facet of their approach to Germany and the future
occupation.
All of this is significant, even if during the first year of occupation the stance of some American occupation authorities
softened and they brought back a number of people from exile—such as the SPD politician Wilhelm Hoegner and a
group of journalists from Switzerland and Britain.  Such instances notwithstanding, the Anglo-American reluctance
to work with German émigrés lived on in the restrictive repatriation measures. Émigrés who sought to return were in
most cases prevented until 1947 or later. The reasons given, such as a lack of transport to Germany, often hid a
multitude of political considerations. And even after the ban was officially relaxed, a return was often a complicated
procedure with endless bureaucratic obstacles, which took years to overcome. The consequences for public health
work of this absence of trusted German collaborators in the first months after the war will be examined in Part II.
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